Dr. Yifat Aran

Gad Weiss, Kobi Ben Chitrit & Yifat Aran, “Let it Go: A Comparative Perspective on the Enforceability of Pay-to-Play Provisions,” TAU Law Rev. (forthcoming).

Provides the first comparative analysis of pay-to-play provisions in venture capital across multiple jurisdictions, examining how different legal regimes shape investor protections and follow-on investment incentives.

Yifat Aran & Nizan Geslevich Packin, “Due Diligence Dilemma,” 2025 U. Ill. L. Rev. 101 (2025).

Identifies a core tension in venture capital between the imperative to invest rapidly and the expectation that VCs serve as gatekeepers through independent diligence, showing how cyclical market conditions incentivize “proxy due diligence”—inferring trustworthiness from the presence of other reputable investors rather than conducting independent verification.

Elizabeth Pollman & Yifat Aran, “Ousted,” 25 Theoretical Inquiries L. 231 (2024).

Challenges the prevailing assumption that founder-CEOs with voting control are untouchable, documenting numerous cases where founders were ousted despite retaining formal power, and mapping the countervailing forces—board dynamics, investor pressure, and reputational mechanisms—that can override governance protections.

Yifat Aran, “The Start-up Law of the Start-up Nation,” 52 Heb. U. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 115 (2025).

Maps the organizational features of venture-backed startups in Israel and analyzes Israeli court cases on shareholder disputes, advocating for a nuanced legal framework adapted to the unique governance dynamics of the startup ecosystem.

Yifat Aran, “Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees,” 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 867 (2019).

Proposes a regulatory framework to improve information disclosure to startup employees receiving equity compensation, arguing that current securities exemptions leave employees unable to assess the value and risks of their stock options.

Yifat Aran, “Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets,” 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1235 (2018).

Develops a novel theoretical framework showing how equity-based compensation serves as a functional substitute for noncompete agreements in startup labor markets, with implications for employee mobility, innovation policy, and the design of compensation contracts.

Yifat Aran & Raviv Murciano-Goroff, “Equity Illusions,” 41(1) The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 196 (2025).

Presents original experimental and survey evidence that startup employees harbor systematic “market illusions” about equity compensation, responding to economically irrelevant signals when deciding to forgo cash for stock options—pointing to significant labor market inefficiencies in the tech sector.

Yifat Aran, “The RSU Time Bomb: Regulating Startup Equity Compensation in the Unicorn Era,” in Research Handbook on the Structure of Private Equity and Venture Capital (Brian J. Broughman & Elisabeth de Fontenay eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2026).

Examines how the shift from stock options to restricted stock units (RSUs) in late-stage startups creates new risks for employees, particularly through double-trigger vesting structures, and proposes regulatory responses for the unicorn era.

Yifat Aran & Moran Ofir, “The Effect of Specialised Courts over Time,” in Time, Law and Change: An Interdisciplinary Study (Sanne Taekema, Sofia Ranchordás & Yaniv Roznai eds., Hart Publ’g 2020).

Evaluates the impact of Israel’s specialized corporate court on corporate and securities law adjudication, providing empirical evidence on how judicial specialization evolves and affects case outcomes over time.

Yifat Aran, Brian J. Broughman & Elizabeth Pollman, “CEO Turnover in Dual-Class Firms,” U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 24-38 (Dec. 2024).

Provides the first large-scale empirical study of CEO turnover at dual-class firms, revealing that founder-CEOs at companies with differential voting structures are replaced more frequently than commonly assumed, and analyzing the governance mechanisms that facilitate these transitions.